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TITLE IX AND TITLE VII:  
PARALLEL REMEDIES IN COMBATTING 
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN  
EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
LYNN RIDGEWAY ZEHRT*  
 The federal circuit courts of appeals are divided over the proper 
relationship between Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments Act of 1972 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Specifically, the federal courts 
disagree over whether an employee of an educational institution may sue her 
employer for employment discrimination under either Title IX or Title VII.  
Some courts have concluded that these employees may not bring employment 
discrimination claims under Title IX, holding that Title VII provides the sole 
avenue for obtaining monetary relief for employment discrimination against 
educational institutions.  Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion, 
holding that Title IX and Title VII constitute parallel remedies, thus permitting 
claimants to recover monetary damages against educational institutions by 
pursuing only a Title IX claim for employment discrimination.  Claimants 
proceeding under the parallel approach have a distinct advantage because by 
proceeding solely under Title IX, they may avoid the administrative process 
required by Title VII, as well as Title VII’s cap on compensatory and punitive 
damages.  
The Article concludes that only the parallel approach is consistent with 
Title IX’s legislative history and purpose.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Article closely examines the 1970 hearings held in the House Subcommittee of 
Education.  The Supreme Court acknowledged in North Haven Board of 
Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), that the origins of Title IX grew out of 
these hearings.   This legislative history is crucial in understanding the purpose 
of Title IX, but it has not been fully explored in previous scholarship.   
These 1970 hearings were historical for many reasons, including that they 
are widely acknowledged to be the first congressional hearings held on the 
education and employment of women in educational institutions.  They 
 
* Professor Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt is an Associate Professor of Law at Belmont University College of 
Law.  LL.M., with distinction, Georgetown Law Center; J.D., magna cum laude, University of 
Alabama School of Law.  This author dedicates this Article to her two daughters, Madeline and 
Elizabeth.  This author also appreciates the contributions of her research assistant, Alyssa Johnson.  
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documented systemic employment discrimination by educational institutions 
against women, including widespread discrimination in hiring, promotions, 
and salaries.  Given the pervasiveness of this employment discrimination and 
the recognized inefficiency of the administrative process available at that time, 
this Article concludes that Congress intended Title IX to provide an additional 
remedy for combatting sex discrimination for these employees.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments Acts of 1972 broadly and 
boldly prohibits sex discrimination in any federally funded educational 
program.1  Although its core antidiscrimination provisions consist of less than 
forty words, the interpretation of these words has been the source of eight 
Supreme Court decisions2 and multiple administrative interpretations through 
formal regulations3 and less formal guidance manuals.4  The text of Title IX 
 
1. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2012)). 
2. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 
(1982); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 
60 (1992); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).  
3. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a)(1) (2018) (regulations issued by the Office for Civil Rights, 
Dep’t of Educ.); 45 C.F.R. § 86.51(a)(1) (2018) (regulations issued by the Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs.); 7 C.F.R. §§ 15a.500–50 (2018) (regulations issued by the Dep’t of Agric.); 13 C.F.R. § 113.3 
(2018) (regulations issued by the Small Bus. Admin.). 
4. See Title IX Legal Manual, § IV.B.2, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (last visited Aug. 6, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix [https://perma.cc/6TNZ-GLTT].  
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contains only one express remedy: the denial of federal funding to any 
educational institution that violates its provisions.5  The Supreme Court 
expanded the effectiveness of Title IX significantly in 1979 when it read an 
implied private right of action into the statute,6 thus placing enforcement power 
into the hands of aggrieved individuals.  Thirteen years later, when the Court 
interpreted Title IX to authorize the recovery of compensatory damages for 
intentional discrimination,7 the statute was transformed yet again into a more 
powerful weapon for individuals challenging sex discrimination.  Not only have 
these interpretations of Title IX expanded the power of the statute, but they also 
have incentivized the filing of Title IX claims not just in the traditional context 
of student athletics but also in the field of employment discrimination.  The 
application of Title IX into the field of employment discrimination has created, 
in turn, the present controversial judicial task of defining the relationship 
between Title IX and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 
The majority of federal circuit courts view Title IX as an independent 
remedy to Title VII in combatting sex discrimination in educational 
employment.9  In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center,10 the Third Circuit 
recently considered whether an employee of an educational institution receiving 
federal funds can sue this employer to recover damages for sex discrimination 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.11  The Third Circuit 
broadly construed the statute, concluding that Title IX prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex,12 and thereby joined with the First,13 
Fourth,14 and Sixth15 Circuits in concluding that Title IX encompassed such 
claims.  By interpreting Title IX as an additional and independent remedy to 
Title VII, these courts further broadened Title IX’s enforcement power by 
 
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012). 
6. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699 (permitting a female student to bring an enforcement action 
under Title IX by recognizing an implied private right of action into the statute). 
7. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. 
8. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012)). 
9. See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3rd Cir. 2017); Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 
92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 
1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).  
10. 850 F.3d at 545. 
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
12. Doe, 850 F.3d at 560. 
13. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881. 
14. Preston, 31 F.3d at 203. 
15. Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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placing it in the hands of teachers and other employees of educational 
institutions who seek monetary recovery for more than just retaliation.16    
The Fifth Circuit17 and Seventh Circuit18 have taken a much narrower view 
of Title IX, holding that Title IX does not provide a private right of action to 
employees of qualifying educational institutions when these employees seek 
damages for intentional sex discrimination committed in the employment 
context.  Instead, these Circuits have held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 196419 provides the “exclusive avenue of relief” for damages to these 
employees.20  Emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme 
Congress created when enacting Title VII,21 including filing deadlines, 
exhaustion of administrative requirements as prerequisites to individual suits, 
and limitations placed on the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, 
these courts have concluded that Title IX may not be used as a vehicle to bypass 
Title VII’s requirements.22  A majority of the federal district courts find this 
view persuasive, and for more than twenty years, these courts have effectively 
dismissed parallel claims brought under Title IX on the ground that these claims 
are preempted by Title VII.23 
 
16. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (interpreting Title IX’s 
prohibition of intentional discrimination to include a claim for retaliation brought by a former high 
school basketball coach).   
17. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995). 
18. Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other 
grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).  
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
20. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753; accord Waid, 91 F.3d at 862 (concluding that “Title VII provided 
the only way by which [plaintiff] could obtain make-whole relief.”). 
21. Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754. 
22. Waid, 91 F.3d at 862; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753. 
23. The following 12 district courts have concluded that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for 
employees seeking monetary relief for sex discrimination from their educational employers. Drisin v. 
Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 1:16-cv-24939-WILLIAMS/TORRES, 2017 WL 3505299 (S.D. Fla. 
June 27, 2017); Torres v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cty., No. 8:14-cv-1021-T-33TBM, 2014 WL 4185364 
(M.D. Fla. Aug 22, 2014); Ludlow v. Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Vandiver v. 
Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 4:03-CV-00834 GTE, 2007 WL 2973463 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 9, 2007); Schultz 
v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of W. Fla., No. 3:06cv442-RS-MD, 2007 WL 1490714 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 
2007); Hankinson v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 6:04-CV-71 (HL), 2005 WL 6802243 (M.D. Ga. 
Oct. 28, 2005); Urie v. Yale Univ., 331 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004); Morris v. Wallace Cmty. 
Coll.–Selma, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 
Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 995 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998); Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F. Supp. 191 (D. Minn. 1997); Storey v. Bd. of Regents 
of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 604 F. Supp 1200 (W.D. Wis. 1985).  The following 6 district courts have 
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that Title IX and Title VII function as parallel remedies. Fox 
v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (D. Kan. 2017); Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. 
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This Article concludes that the expansive approach adopted most recently 
by the Third Circuit is the one most faithful to the legislative history and 
purpose of Title IX, as well as the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of Title 
IX.  Part I of this Article provides a brief discussion of the legislative enactment, 
scope, and purpose of Title VII and Title IX.  Although the Supreme Court has 
not directly addressed the issue explored in this Article, the Supreme Court has 
issued several prior decisions interpreting Title IX, and the relevant decisions 
also are discussed in Part I of this Article as instructive interpretative history.  
The Article then turns in Part II to an analysis of the circuit split regarding 
whether an employee has a private right of action under Title IX for 
employment discrimination.  It concludes in Part III by relying on legislative 
history for the conclusion that Congress intended Title IX to serve as a parallel 
remedy for eradicating the pervasive sex discrimination that existed throughout 
educational institutions at the time of its enactment. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TITLE VII AND TITLE IX 
A.  Title VII’s Origin and Structure  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted as a comprehensive civil rights 
package consisting of eleven separate titles.24  It was enacted pursuant to 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,25 and the initial intended beneficiaries of this legislation were 
African-Americans.26  Specifically, the economic conditions of African-
Americans had declined significantly in the late 1950s due to increasingly high 
unemployment rates, and there were growing concerns about the increasing 
number of violent racial riots in the South.27  Therefore, one of the legislative 
objectives of the Civil Rights Act was to assure “equality of . . . opportunities 
and remove [existing] barriers” for African-Americans,28 and this goal is 
reflected in the statutory structure of this Civil Rights Act.  Title II of the Civil 
 
Supp. 3d 756 (M.D. Pa. 2016); AB v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 224 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); 
Bedard v. Roger Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94 (D.R.I. 1997); Henschke v. N.Y. Hosp.–Cornell 
Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Broussard v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., No. 
92-581, 1993 WL 70203 (E.D. La. Mar 8, 1993). 
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012). 
25. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978). 
26. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). 
27. Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on Damages in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 249, 255–56 (2014). 
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). 
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Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial discrimination in commercial 
establishments open to the public,29 whereas Title IV promoted the 
desegregation of public schools,30 and Title VI prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving 
federal funding.31   
The provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were even more 
ambitious as they broadly strove to eliminate employment discrimination 
among private employers.32  Moreover, Congress expanded the protected 
characteristics of Title VII well beyond race and color discrimination to also 
offer protection on the basis of national origin, religion, and sex.33  With the 
addition of sex as a protected characteristic under Title VII, it became the first 
major piece of federal legislation to offer civil rights protection to women.34 
Despite the monumental accomplishment in enacting Title VII, the original 
text of the statute contained several significant limitations that were enacted to 
achieve the compromise necessary to secure its passage.  Two of these 
limitations provide important historical context to the current debate.  First, 
although the text of Title VII prohibited both public and private employers from 
committing employment discrimination, the statute contained a significant 
exemption excusing educational institutions completely from compliance.35  
This provision, found in Section 702, stated in its original form, that “[t]his title 
shall not apply to . . . an educational institution with respect to the employment 
of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such 
institution.”36  Thus, employees of educational institutions were not protected 
from discrimination and educational institutions were “free, as far as Title VII 
was concerned, to discriminate in [their] employment practices.”37  
Second, Section 705 of Title VII created the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and charged it with the responsibility of preventing 
 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
30. Id. § 2000c. 
31. See id. § 2000d et seq. 
32. See id. § 2000e et seq.  
33. Id.  
34. See Zehrt, supra note 27, at 256.   
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964). 
36. Id. 
37. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 410 (2nd Cir. 1975) (evaluating the Title 
VII claims brought by two female faculty members and describing the individual effectiveness of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act for these plaintiffs); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 
152, 157 (D. Mass. 1975) (discussing the claims for injunctive relief and reinstatement brought by the 
EEOC on behalf of two female faculty members who were fired and the protections now afforded by 
the 1972 amendments to Title VII).   
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unlawful employment practices, but the original statute gave the EEOC no 
enforcement power,38 essentially asking the commission “to kill an elephant 
with a fly gun.”39  One of the goals of the original statutory design was for the 
EEOC to achieve prompt conciliation of employment disputes through 
“persuasion,” thereby ensuring the prompt return of workers to the workforce.40  
Thus, Title VII required all claimants to first file a charge of discrimination with 
the EEOC, or an equivalent state agency, within either 90 or 210 days of the 
alleged unlawful employment practice.41  This administrative process provided 
the EEOC with an opportunity to investigate the charges and resolve them 
through negotiation.42  Congress later amended Title VII and expanded these 
deadlines slightly to 180 and 300 days depending on the existence of a state 
agency, again ratifying the original ideal of encouraging prompt resolution of 
claims.43  This opportunity for the EEOC to attempt prompt conciliation was so 
integral to the statutory design of Title VII that the Supreme Court later deemed 
it a prerequisite to filing a private lawsuit, and a claimant’s failure to satisfy 
these administrative requirements of Title VII precluded subsequent 
litigation.44  Moreover, if the EEOC failed to achieve conciliation, the remedies 
 
38. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (detailing the legislative 
history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act including the different proposals to provide the 
EEOC with enforcement power). 
39. See Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical 
Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 
32 (1977) (quoting Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1967, at 1, col. 6 (statement of Stephen N. Shulman, Chairman, 
EEOC)). 
40. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372–74 (1979) (discussing 
that “[u]nder Title VII, cases of alleged employment discrimination are subject to a detailed 
administrative and judicial process designed to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial and non-
adversary resolution of claims. . . .  At several different points, the statutory plan prevents immediate 
filing of judicial proceedings in order to encourage voluntary conciliation.”); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (explaining that “Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities. . . .  Cooperation and voluntary 
compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal.  To this end, Congress created 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state 
and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an 
opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved 
party was permitted to file a lawsuit.”); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a). 
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(d); see also 110 CONG. REC. 12,724–25 (1964) (statement of 
Sen. Humphrey) (explaining that the deferral to state agencies is based on federalism concerns, namely, 
to preserve states’ historical control over employment relationships). 
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a) et seq. 
43. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103, 105 
(1972). 
44. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976). 
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available to the plaintiff in federal court were minimal, limited to equitable 
relief, including reinstatement and backpay,45 and attorney’s fees,46 and thus 
provided little financial incentive to litigate the action after the conclusion of 
the administrative process. 
Congress attempted to remedy both of these limitations in Title VII through 
the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.47  This statute, 
enacted on March 24, 1972, amended Title VII by providing the EEOC with 
the authority to enforce Title VII through increased investigative power48 and 
the ability to institute civil actions against employers named in the charge of 
discrimination.49   
Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 substantially 
revised Section 702 of Title VII by eliminating the exemption for educational 
institutions.50  Senator Cranston, one of the co-sponsors of the bill in the Senate, 
explained the necessity for this revision to Title VII: 
The existing exemption for employers of educational 
institutions is also eliminated by S. 2515.  There are at present 
over 120,000 educational institutions, with approximately 2.8 
million teachers and professional staff members and another 
1.5 million nonprofessional staff members.  Yet all of these 
employees are, at present, without an effective Federal remedy 
in the area of employment discrimination.  As in other areas of 
employment, statistics for educational institutions indicate that 
minorities, and particularly women, are precluded from the 
more prestigious and higher paying positions and are relegated 
to the more menial and lower paying positions.  I believe it is 
essential that these employees be given the same opportunity 
to redress their grievances as are available to other employees 
in the private sector.51 
Southern opposition to this portion of the Equal Opportunity Act centered 
around a desire to remove religious institutions entirely from Title VII’s 
provisions.52  When efforts to achieve complete exemption for religious 
employers failed, their strategy shifted to negotiating a compromise that 
 
45. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g). 
46. Id. § 706(k). 
47. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 §§ 3–5. 
48. Id. § 5 (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 707(e)). 
49. Id. § 4(a) (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(f)(1)). 
50. Id. § 3. 
51. 118 CONG. REC. S4,931 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972) (statement of Sen. Cranston). 
52. See George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 860 (1972).  
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permitted qualifying religious employers, including religious educational 
institutions, to give employment preferences to members of their own religion, 
thereby permitting them to discriminate only on the basis of religious 
preference.53  The Equal Employment Opportunity Act codified this narrow 
exemption for religious employers by amending Section 702.54  
Not only did the Equal Employment Opportunity Act’s amendment of 
Section 702 ensure that most employees of educational institutions were 
protected by Title VII, but it also significantly expanded the coverage of Title 
VII to two additional groups of employers.  First, it modified Title VII’s 
definition of the term employer to include all state and local governmental 
employers.55  The result of this amendment was estimated at that time to extend 
coverage of Title VII to approximately ten million additional employees.56  
Second, it modified the small business exception by lowering the number of 
employees from twenty-five to fifteen that an employer needed to be exempt 
from compliance,57 adding an “estimated six million private industry 
employees to [the] EEOC’s jurisdiction.”58  Thus, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act strove to improve the effectiveness of Title VII by not only 
giving the EEOC enforcement power, but also by simultaneously increasing the 
number of employees protected from discrimination.  
As it stands today, Title VII currently allows a victim of intentional 
discrimination to recover both compensatory and punitive damages from her 
employer, although these damages are capped collectively in accordance with 
the employer’s size.59  The addition of damages as an available remedy to 
victims of discrimination pursuing claims under Title VII was achieved through 
 
53. The Joint Conference Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 explained 
the history behind the amendment to Section 702: “The Senate Amendment eliminated the present 
exemption from Title VII for educational institutions.  Also, the Senate provision expanded the 
exemption for religious organizations from coverage under this title with respect to the employment of 
individuals of a particular religion in all their activities instead of the present limitation to religious 
activities.  The House bill did not change the existing exemptions.  The House receded.”  S. REP. No. 
92-681, at 16 (1972) (Conf. Rep.). 
54. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166–67 
(4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276–78 (9th Cir. 1982); McClure 
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972). 
55. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a),(f) (2012)). 
56. See Hill, supra note 39, at 52. 
57. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b),(d) 
(2012)). 
58. Hill, supra note 39, at 52. 
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012). 
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the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.60  This was a substantial 
modification to Title VII, both imposing financial consequences to employers 
who failed to comply with its antidiscrimination mandate and providing victims 
of discrimination with financial compensation to make them more fully 
whole.61    
B. Title IX’s General Language and Judicial Expansion 
Approximately three months after Congress passed the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress enacted Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972.62  Although both Title IX and Title VII prohibit 
discrimination, the statutes differ significantly in scope, source of 
Congressional power, remedies, and structure.    
First, whereas Title VII “aim[ed] broadly to eradicate discrimination 
throughout the economy” by comprehensively prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of a number of characteristics,63 the scope of Title IX was limited to 
eradicating sex discrimination in education.64  This narrower scope is 
understandable given the impetus for the enactment of Title IX.  Specifically, 
Title IX was enacted in response to “extensive hearings held in 1970 by the 
House Special Subcommittee on Education” that raised awareness of 
“pervasive discrimination against women with respect to educational 
 
60. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (damages provisions codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012)).  
61. See Zehrt, supra note 27, at 251. 
62. Title IX was enacted on June 23, 1972, via the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972). 
63. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
64. See 118 CONG. REC. S5,803 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“Mr. 
President, one of the great failings of the American educational system is the continuation of corrosive 
and unjustified discrimination against women.  It is clear to me that sex discrimination reaches into all 
facets of education—admissions, scholarship programs, faculty hiring and promotion, professional 
staffing, and pay scales.  Indeed, the recent ‘Report on Higher Education’ funded by the Ford 
Foundation concluded: Discrimination against women, in contrast to that against minorities, is still 
overt and socially acceptable within the academic community.  The only antidote is a comprehensive 
amendment such as the one now before the Senate.  [This Amendment] is broad but basically it closes 
loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs and employment resulting from 
those programs. . . .  [T]he heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in 
educational programs receiving Federal funds.  The amendment would cover such crucial aspects as 
admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions.”). 
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opportunities.”65  Moreover, since the sole focus of these hearings concerned 
sex discrimination in education, Congress applied Title IX’s provisions only to 
educational recipients of federal funding.66 
Title IX and Title VII also differ in their source of Congressional power, 
and the Supreme Court has indicated this difference is a significant one.67  
Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to its powers under the Spending Clause.68  
This Spending Clause legislation is made in the form of a “contract: in return 
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed 
conditions.”69  Whereas Title VII is “framed in terms of an outright prohibition” 
given its grounding under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; in contrast, Title IX “is framed in terms of a condition.”70  During 
the debate in the House of Representatives regarding the Education 
Amendments Act, Representative Mink explained the rationale for enacting 
Title IX under the Spending Clause:  
Any college or university which has [a] . . . policy which 
discriminates against women applicants, . . . is free to do so 
under [Title IX] but such institutions should not be asking the 
taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination.  
Millions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and we 
collectively resent that these funds should be used for the 
support of institutions to which we are denied equal access.71 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court explained that Congress had the following 
two purposes in enacting Title IX: “to prevent the use of federal dollars to 
support discriminatory practices . . . [and] ‘to provide individual citizens 
effective protection against those practices.’”72  
 
65. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing 118 CONG. REC. S5,804 
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)); accord N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 
512, 523 n.13 (1982). 
66. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).  
67. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286–87. 
68. Congress subsequently enacted other antidiscrimination statutes under its Spending Clause 
powers, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394  
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)), and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
94-135, § 303, 89 Stat. 728–29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012)). See Charles F. 
Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining “Discrimination,” 70 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 36 (1981). 
69. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182 (2005).  
70. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286. 
71. 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971). 
72. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). 
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Moreover, Title VII and Title IX provide different statutory remedies.  Title 
VII expressly provides an individual with a private right of action against their 
employer,73 but Title IX does not.74  In the event an educational institution is 
found in violation of Title IX, the only express remedy provided in the statute 
is an administrative one: the termination of federal funding.75    
Despite the narrower scope of Title IX, the Supreme Court has frequently 
declared that Congress chose broad language in prohibiting sex discrimination76 
and that courts must interpret the statute with “a sweep as broad as its 
language.”77  The core of Title IX’s prohibition of sex discrimination is found 
in Section 901(a) and states:  “No person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance . . . .”78 
This portion of Title IX was modelled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, with the word “sex” substituted in Title IX for the word “race” that 
was written into Title VI.79  The similarities between Title VI and Title IX do 
not end with the antidiscrimination provision, however.  Specifically, neither 
statute expressly includes a private right of action.  Instead, both provide the 
termination of federal funding as the only stated remedy.80   
Based on the similarities in statutory design and structure, the Court has 
often interpreted Title IX as consistent with Title VI.81  For instance, the Court 
has implied a private right of action into both statutes.82  This implied right of 
action breathed new life and expansion into Title IX, as it expanded the statute’s 
sole enforcement power from federal agencies and placed part of it into the 
 
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012). 
74. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680–83. 
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012). 
76. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173 (observing that in “all of these [previous] cases, we relied on the 
text of Title IX, which . . . broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting any person to 
discrimination on the basis of sex”) (internal quotations omitted). 
77. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694–95, 694 n.16. 
80. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695–96. 
81. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258–59 (2009); N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 
528–29.  
82. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 716–17 (interpreting Title IX to include a private right of action); 
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983) (observing that a private 
cause of action under Title VI was “implied by the judiciary rather than expressly created by 
Congress”).  
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hands of individuals.83  Scholars have speculated that the Court’s recognition 
of an implied right of action was partially a practical one, shaped by the reality 
that agency enforcement had proven ineffective.84  Specifically, the government 
“ha[d] never cut off . . . funding to punish an educational institution for 
violating Title IX.”85  Moreover, even if it had terminated funding, there were 
serious concerns about whether this extreme remedy would advance the 
statutory purposes of achieving gender equality in education or would instead 
cause harm to victims of sex discrimination.86   
The original private right of action permitted by the Court in Cannon v. 
University of Chicago provided fairly limited remedies, however, and allowed 
the plaintiff to request only injunctive and equitable relief.87  Undoubtedly, this 
relief provided greater protection to an individual victim than the termination 
of funding because the court could order the educational institution to cease its 
discriminatory conduct or policy.88  However, the Court’s creation of this 
implied right of action generated additional questions.  For instance, just as 
Title IX did not expressly provide for a private right of action, it also was silent 
as to whether other remedies were available to victims of discrimination.89  
The Supreme Court again expansively interpreted Title IX in Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Public Schools by unanimously reaching two holdings.  First, 
the Court construed Title IX to include a cause of action for sexual 
 
83. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703. 
84. R. SHEP MELNICK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF TITLE IX: REGULATING GENDER EQUALITY 
IN EDUCATION 15 (Brookings Institution Press, 2018); accord Implied Rights of Action to Enforce 
Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378, 1404 (1978). 
85. MELNICK, supra note 84, at 47. 
86. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704–05 (commenting that the termination of funding is “severe and 
often may not provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the . . . purpose if merely an isolated 
violation has occurred”); N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 552 (Powell, J., dissenting) (observing that the “cutoff 
of funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the 
injustice”); accord U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE 
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 40 (1996) (observing that “[a]lthough 
fund termination may serve as an effective deterrent to recipients, it may leave the victim of 
discrimination without a remedy.  Fund termination may eliminate entirely the benefit[s] sought by the 
victim.”). 
87. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998) (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. 
at 705 n.38, 710 n.44, 711) (clarifying that “when the Court first recognized the implied right under 
Title IX in Cannon, the opinion referred to injunctive or equitable relief in a private action . . . but not 
to a damages remedy”). 
88. N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 552–53 (Powell, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the “cutoff of 
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the injustice to 
the employee.”). 
89. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. 
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harassment.90  The sexual harassment claim in Franklin was not brought by an 
employee, however.  Instead, the plaintiff in Franklin was a high school student 
who alleged that a teacher and coach created a hostile work environment for 
her during school.91  Second, the Court held that Title IX’s implied cause of 
action included the availability of compensatory damages for intentional sex 
discrimination.92  Acknowledging that the text of Title IX was silent with regard 
to the specific remedies available, the Court examined the general “state of the 
law when the Legislature passed Title IX”93 and concluded that the common 
law at that time “regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than 
the rule.”94   
Finally, while Title IX and Title VI share many similarities, they are not 
identical.95  One of these differences warrants discussion here.  Specifically, 
Title VI contains the following important exception that is absent from Title 
IX: “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action 
under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any 
employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor 
organization except where a primary object of the Federal financial assistance 
is to provide employment.”96    
This provision in Title VI has been construed consistently to mean that Title 
VI regulates “employment only in limited circumstances.”97  
Given that this exception is absent from Title IX, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare relied on this statutory distinction when it promulgated 
the following formal regulations in 1975 that prohibited sex discrimination in 
employment:   
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
 
90. 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); see Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) 
(acknowledging that Title IX “does not mention sexual harassment” but citing Franklin for the 
proposition that “we have held that sexual harassment is intentional discrimination encompassed by 
Title IX’s private right of action”). 
91. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63. 
92. Id. at 74. 
93. Id. at 71; see also Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173. 
94. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71; accord Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284 (conceding that this approach to 
remedies “entails a degree of speculation” but explained that “[b]ecause the private right of action 
under Title IX is judicially implied, we have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme 
that best comports with the statute.”). 
95. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)–(9) (2012) (identifying nine programs and organizations 
that are exempt from Title IX), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (containing no exemptions). 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (2012). 
97. Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 4, at § I. 
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discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, 
or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any 
education program or activity operated by a recipient which 
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.98 
Moreover, the Supreme Court upheld these regulations as a valid 
interpretation of Title IX in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell.99  In 
reaching this decision, the Court expansively interpreted the text of Title IX yet 
again, concluding that employees constitute persons within the meaning of its 
prohibition that “no person may be discriminated against on the basis of 
gender.”100  Although the North Haven case is instructive regarding whether 
employees fall within the protected class under Title IX, the Court did not 
discuss whether private judicial actions were available to these plaintiffs.101  
Specifically, the plaintiffs in North Haven complained administratively of sex 
discrimination in educational employment, by filing complaints under Section 
1682 of Title IX with the Department of Education, rather than filing 
complaints in judicial proceedings.102  Therefore, the Court did not consider the 
specific issue of whether these plaintiffs could recover damages under Title IX 
from their educational employers by pursuing private litigation.      
Thirteen years later, the Court interpreted the scope of Title IX to permit at 
least some employees to pursue a judicial proceeding for damages.103  In 
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Court allowed a high school 
basketball coach to pursue a retaliation claim.104  The plaintiff in Jackson did 
not contend that he had been the victim of disparate treatment on the basis of 
his gender.  Instead, he claimed that he had been stripped of his coaching duties 
because he complained of sex discrimination on behalf of the girls’ basketball 
team.105  Writing for the majority in a 5–4 decision, Justice O’Connor 
acknowledged that the text of Title IX did not expressly mention retaliation, yet 
the Court found this omission immaterial.106  The Court interpreted the 
prohibition of sex discrimination in Title IX to encompass retaliation, even 
 
98. 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a)(1) (1975). 
99. 456 U.S. 512, 538 (1982). 
100. Id. at 520. 
101. Id. at 518 (explaining that the lawsuits involved in this case were brought by the employers 
who sought declaratory and injunctive relief that the regulations issued by HEW were invalid). 
102. Id. at 517–18 (explaining that Elaine Dove, a tenured teacher, and Linda Potz, a guidance 
counselor, both filed complaints with HEW). 
103. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182 (2005). 
104. Id. at 178. 
105. Id. at 171–72 (complaining about the girls’ basketball team not receiving equal funding or 
access to athletic equipment and facilities). 
106. Id. at 175. 
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when “the victim of the retaliation [is not] . . . the victim of the discrimination 
that is the subject of the original complaint.”107  
The Court explained the importance of teachers and coaches being 
protected from retaliation, declaring that they were uniquely situated to identify 
and report certain types of discrimination and observing that if their reports 
were not protected under Title IX, “the teacher would have no recourse if he 
were subsequently fired for speaking out.”108  In other words, the plaintiff’s 
conduct presumably was not protected by other statutes, such as Title VII, 
because the underlying discrimination was committed against students and not 
employees.109  Therefore, in the Jackson case, Title IX was the sole avenue of 
relief rather than an alternative remedy.  
The dissent in Jackson emphasized that Congress expressly included 
separate retaliation provisions in other discrimination statutes and concluded 
that “[a] claim of retaliation is not a claim of discrimination on the basis of 
sex.”110  The majority responded to this argument with a sweeping statement 
that has implications in the context of employment discrimination: “Title IX’s 
beneficiaries plainly include all those who are subjected to ‘discrimination’ on 
the basis of sex.”111   
Finally, the language of Title IX is silent with regard to whether private 
individuals are required to exhaust an administrative process as litigants must 
do before filing a lawsuit under Title VII.112  The Supreme Court has briefly 
addressed this issue twice but, admittedly, both cases involved only claims 
brought by students.113  In both cases, however, the Court implied that 
 
107. Id. at 179. 
108. Id. at 180–81. 
109. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011) (holding that “the term 
‘aggrieved’ in Title VII incorporates [the zone of interests] test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an 
interest arguably sought to be protected by the statutes, while excluding plaintiffs who might 
technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory 
prohibitions in Title VII.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
110. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185, 187 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 179 n.3. 
112. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41 (1979) (“[W]e are not persuaded that 
individual suits are inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) (“Title IX has no administrative exhaustion 
requirement. . . .  Plaintiffs can file directly in court under its implied private right of action and can 
obtain the full range of remedies.”). 
113. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680 (involving a plaintiff who was denied admission to medical school 
and claimed the denials was based on her sex); Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 250 (allegations brought by 
female student and her parents contesting inadequate response by school to reports of student on 
student harassment). 
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administrative exhaustion was not required under Title IX.  First, in Cannon, 
the Court stated in a footnote that “we are not persuaded that individual suits 
are inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”114  
Thirty years later, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, the Court 
observed that “Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement . . . .  
Plaintiffs can file directly in court [under Title IX’s implied private right of 
action], and can obtain the full range of remedies.”115 
 Thus, the Court’s expansive judicial interpretations in Cannon, North 
Haven, and Jackson, and its conclusion that claimants do not have an 
administrative exhaustion requirement under Title IX, have paved the way for 
the current disagreement over the relationship between Title VII and Title IX.  
Given the Court’s decision in North Haven that Title IX prohibits sex 
discrimination in educational employment, can an employee of an educational 
institution elect to sue her employer for compensatory damages solely under 
Title IX and thus avoid the conciliatory administrative process in Title VII?  
Alternatively, did Congress intend that Title VII would preempt these monetary 
claims and, therefore, serve as the sole avenue for employment discrimination 
claims against educational institutions?  It is to this disagreement that this 
Article now turns. 
III. THE UNSETTLED DEBATE OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE IX 
AND TITLE VII 
In four federal circuits, employees of academic institutions may sue their 
employers for sex discrimination in employment under either Title VII or Title 
IX.116  As previously discussed, both statutes prohibit sex discrimination in 
employment, so an employee of a qualifying educational institution may bring 
parallel claims for sex discrimination under both statutes, or may elect to litigate 
under only one of them.  In these circuits, proceeding solely under Title IX has 
its advantages.  These litigants have a more direct route to the courthouse 
because they need not satisfy Title VII’s administrative procedures with the 
EEOC or a possible deferral to a state agency.117  Moreover, these litigants also 
have the potential to recover greater compensatory damages under Title IX 
 
114. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707 n.41. 
115. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255. 
116. See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3rd Cir. 2017); Ivan v. Kent State 
Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll. 31 F.3d 203 
(4th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). 
117. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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given these awards are not subject to caps as are awards under Title VII.118  On 
the other hand, in two circuits, employees of educational institutions are forced 
to bring their employment discrimination claims under Title VII, because these 
courts have declared that Title VII is the “exclusive avenue of relief” for a 
monetary recovery.119  This Article now will explore the justifications and legal 
authority supporting each approach.  
A. Title VII is the Exclusive Remedy 
Two circuit courts of appeals have concluded that Title VII “provides the 
exclusive remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the 
basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions.”120  Although these 
initial decisions by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits were issued over twenty years 
ago, numerous district courts outside these jurisdictions have found their legal 
justifications persuasive.121  
The first decision, issued by the Fifth Circuit in Lakoski v. James, involved 
a female professor who sued her former employer, a university, for sex 
discrimination after her tenure application had been rejected for the third time 
and her teaching contract was not renewed.122  This plaintiff neither filed a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC, nor included a Title VII claim in her 
complaint.123  Instead, she challenged her adverse employment actions under 
Title IX, state tort law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.124  The primary relief requested 
by the plaintiff in her complaint was compensatory and punitive damages; the 
plaintiff did not pursue an administrative claim for the termination of 
funding.125  Therefore, the sole issue before the court was whether the plaintiff 
had a private right of action under Title IX to recover damages for employment 
discrimination.   
 
118. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 
60, 74 (1992). 
119. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 
F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996). 
120. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753; accord Waid, 91 F.3d at 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that “Title 
VII provided the only way by which Waid could obtain make-whole relief.”). 
121. See cases cited supra note 23. 
122. 66 F.3d at 752. 
123. Id. at 753. 
124. Id. at 752. 
125. See id. at 752–53.  
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The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was foreclosed from receiving 
any monetary recovery for employment discrimination under Title IX126 and 
the court offered three primary justifications for its conclusions that Title VII 
preempts claims for money damages under Title IX.  First, the Fifth Circuit 
emphasized the difference in statutory structure between Title IX and Title VII.  
The court noted that Congress established a comprehensive administrative 
scheme when it enacted Title VII.127  Yet, the court observed, Congress 
provided no express private right of action when it subsequently enacted Title 
IX.128  While acknowledging that the Supreme Court implied a cause of action 
into Title IX in its decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Fifth Circuit 
distinguished that decision by noting it involved a claim by a “student” and not 
“a claim of employment discrimination by an employee.”129  Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court’s prior Title IX decisions did not 
answer the question of whether an employee could bring a private cause of 
action under for sex discrimination in the employment context.130 
Second, the differences in statutory structure were especially significant, 
according to the Fifth Circuit, given the legislative history surrounding the 
enactment of Title IX.131  Specifically, the amendments to Title VII, adopted 
through the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, occurred just three 
months before the enactment of Title IX, and this provided strong evidence of 
Congressional intent to preclude a private right of action under Title IX for 
employment discrimination.132  The Fifth Circuit explained that an earlier 
version of Title IX, H.R. 7248, which was the original bill proposed in the 
House, included a provision to remove the education exemption from Title 
VII.133  Once Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 
the court reasoned that this enactment “obviated the need for [Title IX] to close 
[this] loophole in Title VII.  The final bill enacted by Congress omitted the 
language amending Title VII but left the provision prohibiting sex 
discrimination in federally funded educational institutions.”134   
 
126. Id. at 753 (noting that “[w]e limit our holding to individuals seeking money damages under 
Title IX . . . for employment practices for which Title VII provides a remedy, expressing no opinion 
whether Title VII excludes suits seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief.”). 
127. Id. at 754. 
128. Id. at 755. 
129. Id. at 754. 
130. Id. at 754–55. 
131. Id. at 756–57. 
132. Id. at 756. 
133. Id. at 756–57. 
134. Id. at 757. 
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Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded after examining both the statutory design 
and legislative history that Congress did not intend to “[offer] . . . Title IX to 
employees of federally funded educational institutions so as to provide a bypass 
to Title VII’s administrative procedures.”135  Instead, the court reasoned: 
Congress chose two remedies for the same right, not two rights 
addressing the same problem.  Title VII provided individuals 
with administrative and judicial redress for employment 
discrimination, while Title IX empowered federal agencies that 
provided funds to educational institutions to terminate that 
funding upon the finding of employment discrimination.  In 
other words, Congress intended to bolster the enforcement of 
the pre-existing Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination in 
federally funded educational institutions; Congress did not 
intend Title IX to create a mechanism by which individuals 
could circumvent the pre-existing Title VII remedies.136  
Third, the Fifth Circuit concluded that its interpretation of Title VII in this 
case was compelled by two prior decisions of the Supreme Court, Great 
American Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny,137 and Brown v. General 
Services Administration.138  In Novotny, the Supreme Court held that the 
deprivation of a right created by Title VII could not form the basis of a claim 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).139  The Court in Novotny discussed Title 
VII’s “comprehensive plan,” the requirement that claimants file a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, and the underlying Congressional purpose “to 
encourage voluntary conciliation.”140  If plaintiffs could bring these claims 
through § 1985(3) rather than Title VII, the Supreme Court observed that the 
“complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific 
[requirements]” of Title VII, and “completely bypass the administrative 
process, which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress 
in Title VII.”141  Similarly, in Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
federal employee could not bring a claim against the United States under 42 
 
135. Id. at 758. 
136. Id. at 757; accord Ludlow v. Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (finding 
persuasive “the Fifth Circuit’s legislative history analysis showing that Title IX was intended to be a 
supplemental remedy in the educational setting—i.e. a ‘big stick’ that federal agencies could use 
against allegations of sex discrimination, separate and apart from an individual’s right to sue under 
Title VII.”). 
137. 442 U.S. 366 (1979). 
138. 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). 
139. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378. 
140. Id. at 373–74. 
141. Id. at 375–76. 
 
ZEHRT, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:24 AM 
2019] TITLE IX: PARALLEL REMEDY 721 
U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination in his employment.142  Instead, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Section 717 of Title VII provided the exclusive 
avenue of relief to federal employees complaining of employment 
discrimination.143  Thus, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Novotny and Brown to conclude that Title VII likewise provides 
the exclusive remedy for monetary damages to employees of federally funded 
educational institutions complaining of sex discrimination.144  Given its 
conclusion that Title IX did not provide monetary damages for employment 
discrimination, and that the plaintiff chose not to pursue a remedy under Title 
VII, the Fifth Circuit concluded that judgment should be entered in favor of the 
plaintiff’s employer.145 
Numerous district courts were persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Lakoski and, accordingly, these courts rejected similar monetary claims for 
employment discrimination made by employees of federally funded 
educational institutions under Title IX.146  These courts were careful to limit the 
scope of their holdings by observing “that Title VII does not preempt all Title 
IX claims of employment discrimination, but only those claims that seek relief 
available under Title VII (i.e, claims for money damages would be preempted 
while claims for injunctive relief related to federal funding, as not provided for 
by Title VII, would not).”147  They also advanced additional policy concerns 
about permitting employment discrimination claims to proceed under Title IX.  
 
142. Brown, 425 U.S. at 828 n.10. 
143. Id. at 834. 
144. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1995). 
145. Id. at 758. 
146. See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (following Lakoski 
and holding that “Title VII provided the only way” plaintiff could recover); see also Schultz v. Bd. of 
Trs. of the Univ. of W. Fla., No. 3:06cv442-RS-MD, 2007 WL 1490714, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 
2007) (concluding “consistent with the weight of authority, that the ‘precisely drawn, detailed 
enforcement structure’ and ‘comprehensive remedial scheme’ that is Title VII preempts the more 
general remedy under Title IX.”); Urie v. Yale Univ., 331 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97–98 (D. Conn. 2004) 
(observing that “[m]ost courts that have taken up the issue agree that Title IX was not intended to 
enable employees of educational institutions complaining of gender discrimination to bypass the 
remedial scheme Congress established in Title VII.”); Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F. 
Supp. 191, 193 (D. Minn. 1997) (declaring that “most courts have rejected” these types of claims under 
Title IX and concluding that this court agrees “that there is no private action for damages available to 
a college employee under Title IX for sex discrimination”). 
147. Gibson v. Hickman, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1481, 1484 (M.D. Ga. 1998); accord Kemether v. Pa. 
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that the Third 
Circuit has not addressed this issue, but following Lakoski and concluding that plaintiff’s employment 
discrimination claims under Title IX are barred “to the extent that [those] claims could have been 
brought under Title VII”).  
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If employment discrimination suits for monetary damages were permitted 
under Title IX, these suits would circumvent Title VII’s statutory cap on 
damages, as well as Title VII’s administrative requirements.148  This would 
allow “plaintiffs who work at federally funded [educational] institutions 
unfettered ability to bring what are in reality Title VII sexual discrimination 
[suits] without adhering to the same rules required of every other employment 
discrimination plaintiff in the country.”149 
In more recent decisions, district courts following the exclusive remedy 
approach also have distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. 
Birmingham Board of Education,150 and determined that it does not compel a 
different result when analyzing whether Title IX provides a monetary remedy 
to employees who are victims of sex discrimination.151  Concluding that the 
Supreme Court has not addressed the specific question of whether Title VII 
preempts Title IX when employees seek monetary relief for sex 
discrimination,152 these courts limit the scope of the Court’s decision in Jackson 
to recognizing only a private cause of action under Title IX for retaliation.153  It 
is true, these courts concede, that the plaintiff in Jackson was a high school 
employee.154  Nonetheless, it is significant that the Supreme Court reached this 
result after observing that the plaintiff in Jackson had “no recourse” for 
retaliation except under Title IX.155  On the other hand, plaintiffs who sue their 
 
148. See, e.g., Drisin v. Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 1:16-cv-24939-WILLIAMS/TORRES, 
2017 WL 3505299, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2017); Torres v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cty., No. 8:14-cv-
1021-T-33TBM, 2014 WL 4185364, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2014); Gibson, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1484; 
Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 995 F. Supp. 398, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
149. See, e.g., Gibson, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1484; Drisin, 2017 WL 3505299, at *7. 
150. 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005).  
151. Vandiver v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 4:03-CV-00834 GTE, 2007 WL 2973463, at *15 
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 9, 2007) (agreeing that “Jackson should not be read to expand private rights of action 
under Title IX to include claims of employment discrimination which have no connection to the rights 
of students, as the Supreme Court’s seminal cases regarding Title IX private rights of action relate to 
claims by students against funding recipients.”); accord Drisin, 2017 WL 3505299, at *5 (conceding 
that “[c]entral to the split among the federal courts is a disagreement over the parameters of Title IX 
in connection with [several] Supreme Court cases.”).  
152. Drisin, 2017 WL 3505299, at * 4; Torres, 2014 WL 4185364, at *5; Schultz v. Bd. of Trs. 
of the Univ. of W. Fla., No. 3:06cv442-RS-MD, 2007 WL 1490714, at *2 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2007).  
153. Vandiver, 2007 WL 2973463, at *15. 
154. Ludlow v. Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824, 832 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
155. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180–81 (observing that “if Title IX’s private right of action [did] not 
encompass retaliation claims, the teacher would have no recourse if he were subsequently fired for 
speaking out” and therefore “the underlying discrimination would go unremedied”); accord Lauren 
Stewart, Circumventing Congress’s Comprehensive Schemes: The Third Circuit Allows Employees of 
Educational Institutions to Bypass Title VII and Bring Claims under Title IX in Doe v. Mercy Catholic 
Medical Center, 59 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 168, 186 (2018) (distinguishing Jackson on the 
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educational employers for sex discrimination under Title IX have full recourse 
under Title VII, and thus no need “to look beyond the comprehensive scope of 
remedies and actions available . . . under Title VII.”156   
For approximately ten years, the interpretation that Title VII provides the 
exclusive monetary remedy to these educational employees seemed to be the 
prevailing view and it remains the majority view among district courts.157  As 
set forth below, the alternate view, that Title IX and Title VII are parallel 
remedies, has gained momentum in recent years.  
B. Title IX and Title VII are Parallel Remedies 
Four different Circuit Courts of Appeals and numerous federal district 
courts have permitted employees of federally funded educational institutions to 
bring employment discrimination claims under Title IX by adopting a much 
broader view of the relationship between Title IX and Title VII.158  In these 
courts, Title IX and Title VII are analogous but parallel remedies, and Title IX 
functions as an additional safeguard for preventing sex discrimination.159  
 
grounds that “plaintiff was not the direct victim of sex-based discrimination and therefore likely did 
not have a claim under Title VII.”). 
156. Ludlow, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 833. 
157. See, e.g., Schultz, 2007 WL 1490714, at *3 (concluding that “the weight of authority” has 
concluded that “Title VII preempts the more general remedy under Title IX”); Urie v. Yale Univ., 331 
F. Supp. 2d 94, 97–98 (D. Conn. 2004) (observing that “[m]ost courts that have taken up the issue 
agree that Title IX was not intended to enable employees of educational institutions complaining of 
gender discrimination to bypass the remedial scheme Congress established in Title VII.”); Cooper v. 
Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F. Supp. 191, 193 (D. Minn. 1997) (declaring that “most courts have 
rejected the theory that employees of an educational institution have an implied cause of action for 
damages under Title IX.”). 
158. See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3rd Cir. 2017); Ivan v. Kent State 
Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 
(4th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Fox v. Pittsburg State 
Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (D. Kan. 2017); Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756 (M.D. Pa. 
2016); Kohlhausen v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., No. 7:10-CV-3168, 2011 WL 1404934 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 9, 2011); AB v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 224 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Bedard v. Roger 
Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94 (D.R.I. 1997); Broussard v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., No. 
92-581, 1993 WL 70203 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 1993). 
159. See, e.g., Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (concluding “that Title VII is not the exclusive 
remedy for gender-based employment discrimination claims and that ‘Title IX . . . function[s] as an 
additional safeguard against gender-based discrimination. . . .’”); AB, 224 F.R.D. at 153 (finding “that 
Title IX was intended by Congress to function as an additional safeguard against gender-based 
discrimination in the context of federally funded education programs; notwithstanding the possibility 
of other available remedies, including without limitation those available under Title VII.”); accord 
Henschke v. N.Y. Hosp.–Cornell Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that “Title 
IX demonstrates an intent on the part of Congress to have Title IX serve as an additional protection 
against gender-based discrimination.”). 
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Under this interpretation, an employee of an educational institution may either 
file a lawsuit under both statutes for the same violation, or they may elect to sue 
their educational employer under only one of them and this solitary claim may 
consist solely of Title IX.  These courts have offered three primary justifications 
for their view that Title IX is a parallel remedy: the text of Title IX; guidance 
from three Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title IX; and the Court’s 
preemption analysis in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,160 which 
explores the relationship between Title VII and another civil rights statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1981.161   
First, these courts have emphasized that the text of Title IX broadly declares 
that “no person” shall be discriminated against on the basis of sex.162  Thus, 
these courts have concluded that employees are persons, within the protection 
of Title IX, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in North Haven.163  
Given the statute’s expansive language, these courts also have relied on the 
Supreme Court’s repeated instruction that the scope of Title IX must “sweep as 
broad as its language.”164  
These courts also have relied upon the silence in the text of Title IX, 
namely, that Title IX does not explicitly define its relationship with other 
statutes.165  These courts have construed the silence to weigh against 
preemption, explaining “that if Congress intended for Title VII to preempt 
employment discrimination claims under Title IX, it could have drafted Title 
IX, which was enacted after Title VII, to state as much.”166      
 
160. See 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
162. Doe, 850 F.3d at 561; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896; Preston, 31 F.3d at 205; Winter, 172 F. 
Supp. 3d at 775. 
163. See, e.g., Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1125 (D. Kan. 2017) (citing N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. 
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982)). 
164. Doe, 850 F.3d at 555 (citing N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of 
Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005) (quoting N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896 (quoting 
N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521); see also Bedard v. Roger Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.R.I. 
1997). 
165. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 775; Kohlhausen v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., No. 7:10-CV-
3168, 2011 WL 1404934, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011). 
166. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 775; accord Kohlhausen, 2011 WL 1404934, at *12 (explaining 
that “[j]ust as Congress could have said that it intended Title IX to supplement remedies available 
under Title VII, Congress could also have explicitly indicated that the 1972 Amendments would secure 
Title VII as the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination.  Congress said neither.  Thus, given 
the broad scope of Title IX, and the Supreme Court’s recognition that multiple, often overlapping, 
remedies exist for employment discrimination, this Court concludes that Title IX is not preempted 
where a plaintiff also brings a claim under Title VII.”). 
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Second, courts following the parallel remedy approach assert that this 
approach is more faithful to several Title IX decisions issued by the Supreme 
Court, namely the Cannon, North Haven and Jackson decisions.167  Although 
these courts acknowledge that the Supreme Court has not answered the precise 
question of whether Title IX and Title VII have concurrent applicability,168 
these courts conclude that that “the Supreme Court’s ‘next logical step’” is “to 
recognize a private cause of action under Title IX for employment 
discrimination.”169  
For instance, these courts emphasize that in Cannon, the Supreme Court 
recognized a private remedy “not explicitly limited to . . . student[s]” but 
instead spoke in more general terms, articulating a remedy “‘in favor of 
individual persons’ or ‘persons discriminated against on the basis of sex.’”170  
Twenty-five years later, these courts reiterate, the Supreme Court in Jackson 
extended Title IX’s private right of action to include an employee complaining 
of retaliation.171  These courts observe that the Supreme Court in Jackson 
specifically recognized that “Title VII is a vastly different statute” than Title 
IX, yet “the Supreme Court did not indicate that Title VII displaced relief under 
Title IX.”172  Thus, these courts have declared, that “Jackson and the decisions 
before it make plain: When a funding recipient retaliates against a ‘person,’ 
including an employee, because she complains of sex discrimination, that’s 
 
167. See, e.g., AB v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 224 F.R.D. 144, 151–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(identifying a circuit split and explaining that “central to this split is a disagreement over the degree to 
which the parameters of Title IX have been established by three Supreme Court cases.”); accord 
Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (describing that the “disagreement over the scope of Title IX . . . has 
been established by three (3) Supreme Court cases.”). 
168. See, e.g., Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (recently characterizing as “unsettled” the issue of 
whether Title VII displaces relief under Title IX and stating that the Court has not yet concluded 
whether “title VII displaces relief under Title IX”).  
169. Bedard, 989 F. Supp. at 97; accord Doe, 850 F.3d at 559 (deciding whether “Cannon 
extends” to plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims). 
170. Kohlhausen, 2011 WL 1404934, at *11 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 
691, 694 (1979)); accord Broussard v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., No. 92-581, 1993 WL 
70203, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 1993) (concluding that “Defendants’ attempt to limit the holding of 
Franklin to its facts (i.e., a claim by a student as compared to an employee in this case) is without 
merit.  No such distinction was relied on by the Franklin Court in reaching its decision.”).  
171. Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (stating the Supreme Court in Jackson “allowed the employee’s 
retaliation claim to proceed under Cannon.”); accord Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 
167, 184 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating that the majority “holds that the private right of 
action under Title IX . . . for sex discrimination that it implied in Cannon . . . extends to claims of 
retaliation.”). 
172. Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175). 
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‘intentional discrimination’ based on sex, violative of Title IX and actionable 
under Cannon’s implied cause of action.”173   
The Court’s decision in North Haven is “particularly illuminating” to this 
legal issue,174 these courts posit, because in this case, the Supreme Court 
“effectively expanded the meaning of the words ‘no person’ found in section 
1681(a) to include employees of the institution receiving federal funds.”175  
Additionally, they emphasize that the Court in North Haven specifically 
addressed the issue of the availability of overlapping remedies for employment 
discrimination, but dismissed those objections: 
The Court rejected the argument that Title IX shouldn’t extend 
to private employment because employees “have remedies 
other than those available under Title IX,” like Title VII.  Even 
if “alternate remedies are available and their existence is 
relevant,” it rejoined, “Congress has provided a variety of 
remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate employment 
discrimination.”176  
The courts also have observed that the North Haven decision identified 
several examples of employment decisions that constitute sex discrimination 
prohibited by Title IX.177  These examples, although dicta, provide supporting 
evidence that the Supreme Court would likely extend Cannon’s “private right 
of action [to] employees and students alike.”178  
Finally, courts adopting the parallel remedy approach often rely on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., for the 
proposition that the Court “has already rejected the argument that Title VII is 
 
173. Doe, 850 F.3d at 563–64.  
174. Id. at 562. 
175. Bedard v. Roger Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.R.I. 1997).  
176. Doe, 850 F.3d at 561 (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26 
(1982)); accord Kohlhausen v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., No. 7:10-CV-3168, 2011 WL 1404934, 
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011). 
177. Bedard, 989 F. Supp. at 97 (explaining that “a female employee who works in a federally 
funded education program is ‘subjected to discrimination under’ that program if she is paid a lower 
salary for like work, given less opportunity for promotion, or forced to work under more adverse 
conditions than are her male colleagues.”) (quoting N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521). 
178. Kohlhausen, 2011 WL 1404934, at *11; accord Bedard, 989 F. Supp. at 97 (stating that 
“this court agrees with those courts which predictively view the Supreme Court’s ‘next logical step’ as 
being to recognize a private cause of action under Title IX for employment discrimination against a 
federally funded education program.”) (quoting Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. 
Tex. 1994)).  
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the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination.”179  In Johnson, the 
plaintiff sued his employer for race discrimination under both Title VII and 42 
U.S.C. § 1981.180  Section 1981, like Title IX, has no administrative 
requirement prior to filing suit, yet the Supreme Court held in Johnson that it 
was possible for a claimant to file suit under both Title VII and Section 1981.181  
The Supreme Court observed that these two statutory claims were 
“related, . . . directed to most of the same ends, [and] are separate, distinct, and 
independent.”182  Moreover, similar arguments were made in Johnson that 
allowing an independent claim under Section 1981 would permit the 
circumvention of Title VII’s administrative requirements.183  Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court dismissed these concerns, acknowledging that Title VII was 
“design[ed] as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious 
discrimination in employment” but holding that such design clearly does “not 
deprive[]” the individual “of other remedies he possesses and [he] is not limited 
to Title VII in his search for relief.”184  
Not only has the parallel remedy approach been increasingly favored by 
courts, but it also has been adopted by the Department of Justice.185  In its Title 
IX Legal Manual, the Department of Justice states that it “takes the position 
that Title IX and Title VII are separate enforcement mechanisms.  Individuals 
can use both statutes to attack the same violations.”186  As justification for this 
position, the Department of Justice explains that this interpretation is 
“consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions on Title IX.”187  
The argument that the Supreme Court’s Title IX decisions support the 
parallel remedy approach is a persuasive one, not only for the holdings and 
explanations given by the Court in these decisions, but also for the Court’s 
approach when implying a private right of action into a civil rights statute such 
as Title IX.  As the Supreme Court has explained numerous times, when 
 
179. Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1123 (D. Kan. 2017); accord Doe, 850 
F.3d at 560; Kazar v. Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa., 679 F. App’x 156, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2017) (Shwartz, 
J., concurring). 
180. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 456 (1975). 
181. Id. at 460. 
182. Id. at 460–61. 
183. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 560; Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1123; Kazar, 679 F. App’x at 164–65 
(Shwartz, J., concurring). 
184. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459. 
185. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant and Urging 
Reversal at 26–27, Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (2016) (No. 16-1247), 2016 WL 
3227568. 
186. Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 4, at § IV.B.2.  
187. Id. 
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“determining whether to infer a private [right] of action from a federal statute, 
our focal point is Congress’ intent in enacting the statute.”188  In both the 
Cannon and North Haven decisions, the Supreme Court considered the 
legislative history of Title IX as part of its determination of Congressional 
intent.  Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history here for 
any insight into whether Congress intended Title IX to provide a private remedy 
for employment discrimination.  As explained below, the legislative history 
shows that Congress intended Title IX to prohibit sex discrimination in 
employment, and there is no indication that Congress intended that Title IX 
employment discrimination claims would be preempted by Title VII.   
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT 
CONGRESS INTENDED TITLE IX TO SERVE AS A PARALLEL REMEDY FOR 
EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE IX 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted several civil rights statutes that 
did not expressly include a private remedy.189  Both Title IX and Title VI are 
examples of civil rights statutes without express private rights of action, and the 
Supreme Court has found implied private rights of action under both.190  Given 
the prevalence of civil rights statutes enacted during these years,191 in Cort v. 
Ash the Supreme Court articulated a test involving the consideration of four 
factors which were “relevant” to the question of whether courts should imply a 
right of action from a federal statute.192  In its decision, the Court did not 
 
188. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988); accord Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. 
Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009) (explaining that “[t]hese cases establish that ‘[t]he crucial 
consideration is what Congress intended.’”) (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012).  
189. See Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 
Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.); Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 794, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 794 et. seq. (2012)). 
190. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688–89 (1979) (implying a private right of action 
for the petitioner, a student, under Title IX); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (observing 
that it is “beyond dispute that private individuals may sue” under Title VI to address allegations of 
intentional discrimination). 
191. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); See generally Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil 
Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, supra note 84 (explaining that “the Supreme Court made no 
explicit attempt to summarize the criteria for implying private rights [of action] until its 1975 decision 
in Cort v. Ash” and demonstrating that each of the factors “were based on principles drawn from the 
dominant strand of Supreme Court precedent dealing with implication”). 
192. In Cort v. Ash, the Court held that four factors were “relevant” when “determining whether 
a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one.” 422 U.S. at 78.  These factors 
were: “[f]irst, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted’—that 
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?  Second, is there any indication of 
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indicate whether all factors were required or whether any of them carry more 
significance than others.193   
Four years later, the Supreme Court clarified that an analysis of all four 
factors was not necessary in every case, and declared that “[t]he central inquiry 
remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by 
implication, a private cause of action.”194  Accordingly, scholars have 
concluded that the Court in later decisions “shift[ed] away from the multi-
factored Cort test used in Cannon” and replaced it with a congressional intent 
analysis.195 
In Thompson v. Thompson, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, 
reiterated that the “focal point is Congress’ intent in enacting the statute” and 
the four factors were merely “guides” to be used “along with other tools of 
statutory construction.”196  Justice Marshall also explained the necessary 
evidence required to support a finding of congressional intent, as follows: 
Our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we 
 
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?  Third, is it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff?  And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically 
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on 
federal law?” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
193. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979) (rejecting 
the argument that it must consider each of the factors articulated in Cort); Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575–76 (1979) (acknowledging that the decision in Cort “did not decide that 
each of these factors is entitled to equal weight” and concluding that the Court’s analysis may end after 
an examination of the text and legislative history).   
194. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 23–24; Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575–76; accord California v. 
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (stating that “[c]ases subsequent to Cort have explained that the 
ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.”); accord Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009) (instructing courts that when deciding whether a 
statute is an exclusive remedy, the proper inquiry is whether “Congress intended a statute’s remedial 
scheme to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert the claim[s]”).   
195. Douglas P. Ruth, Title VII & Title IX = ?: Is Title IX the Exclusive Remedy for Employment 
Discrimination in the Educational Sector?, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 185, 208 (1996); accord 
Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. 
REV. 67, 87-88 (2001) (analyzing the Court’s decisions interpreting Cort v. Ash, and concluding that 
even “the Justices bickered about whether Cort v. Ash retained any vitality”); H. Miles Foy, III, Some 
Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 
71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 565 (1986) (observing that “[i]n several decisions in the late 1970s and early 
1980s the Court rearranged, restated, or simply ignored the other three factors of the Cort v. Ash 
analysis.  Congressional intent became the primary, and the ultimate, concern.”) (footnotes omitted). 
196. 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988); see also id. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that “[i]t 
could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, converting one of its four factors 
(congressional intent) into the determinative factor.”). 
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require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the 
statute, actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of 
action.  The implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual 
dead letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors when 
Congress simply forgot to codify its evident intention to 
provide a cause of action.  Rather, as an implied cause of action 
doctrine suggests, “the legislative history of a statute that does 
not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be 
equally silent or ambiguous on the question.”  We therefore 
have recognized that Congress’ “intent may appear implicitly 
in the language or structure of the statute, or in the 
circumstances of its enactment.”  The intent of Congress 
remains the ultimate issue, however, and “unless this 
congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the 
statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the 
essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply 
does not exist.”197  
In accordance with these decisions, it is appropriate, therefore, to analyze 
whether Congress intended Title IX to serve as an additional remedy for 
employment discrimination.  As set forth below, the language of the statute, as 
well as the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of 
Title IX, support the view that Congress so intended. 
First, Congressional intent to provide a private cause of action may be 
gleaned from the text of Title IX.198  The text of Title IX “broadly prohibits a 
funding recipient from subjecting any person to ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis 
of sex.’”199  The textual analysis regarding the meaning of the word “person” 
in Title IX need not be extensive or novel because the Supreme Court held in 
North Haven that an employee qualifies as a “person” within the meaning of 
the statute.200  The Court observed that “Congress easily could have substituted 
‘student’ or ‘beneficiary’ . . . if it had wished to restrict the scope of” Title IX, 
and yet Congress chose the word “person” instead.201  Therefore, the language 
of Title IX supports the conclusion that Title IX protects employees from 
discrimination on the basis of sex.202 
 
197. Id. at 179 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).  
198. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (explaining that “our analysis must begin with the 
language of the statute itself”) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979)). 
199. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005). 
200. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520 (1982). 
201. Id. at 521. 
202. Id. at 522. 
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The next task is to analyze “the Act’s legislative history for evidence as to 
whether Congress meant somehow to limit the expansive language” of Title 
IX.203  An examination of the legislative history of Title IX shows, however, 
that from the very beginning, Title IX was viewed as a parallel remedy, 
intended to strengthen the powers of the EEOC to eradicate sex discrimination. 
Title IX was the product of over six years of legislative effort designed to 
bolster the prohibitions of sex discrimination in Title VII.204  As previously 
discussed, when Title VII was enacted in 1964, it contained significant 
limitations; two are particularly relevant to the current discussion.  First, Title 
VII contained an Educational Exemption found in Section 701, which rendered 
all employees of educational institutions unprotected from employment 
discrimination.205  Second, even for those employees who were protected by 
Title VII, the protection had limited benefit because Congress did not give the 
EEOC any enforcement power, preferring instead to require the EEOC to 
investigate and attempt conciliation of all charges of discrimination.206  
Following the enactment of Title VII, the EEOC was overwhelmed with 
investigating and processing the number of charges that were filed.207  
Specifically, the anticipated number of charges “had been vastly 
underestimated; it was predicted to receive about two thousand charges in its 
first year, but the actual figure was 8,852” including  an “unexpectedly high 
number of sexual discrimination charges.”208  Given the EEOC’s lack of 
enforcement power, heavy caseload, limited personnel, and small budget, 
scholars have observed that the results obtained by “the EEOC [were] 
mixed . . . and the enthusiasm that initially greeted the enactment of Title VII 
and the creation of the EEOC waned.”209  
In 1965, President Johnson signed Executive Order 11,246 which 
prohibited federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, color, 
religion, or national origin.210  Several women’s advocacy groups, including the 
National Organization for Women, subsequently urged President Johnson to 
 
203. Id. 
204. See id. at 523. 
205. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964). 
206. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
207. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 671, 674 (2005). 
208. See id. at 674–75. 
209. See id. at 676. 
210. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 28, 1965).  
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extend similar protection to women.211  President Johnson amended this 
Executive Order effective October 13, 1968, to include discrimination based on 
sex, and renamed it as Executive Order 11,375.212  
Dr. Bernice R. Sandler, who was then employed as a part-time professor at 
the University of Maryland, is largely credited as the first person to utilize 
Executive Order 11,375 for the benefit of women in educational institutions.213  
Despite the existence of seven vacancies for full time faculty in her department 
at the University of Maryland, Dr. Sandler was rejected for consideration 
because she was female, and she knew that the employment discrimination she 
had experienced within academic institutions was not unusual.214  Dr. Sandler 
thus began researching ways to achieve change and when she discovered the 
executive order, she “made the connection that[,] since most universities and 
colleges had federal contracts[,] they were forbidden from discriminating in 
employment on the basis of sex.”215  She recently had joined a women’s 
advocacy group, the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL), and she 
approached them about using Executive Order 11,375 to improve conditions 
for women in educational institutions.216  Thereafter, Dr. Sandler was named 
Chair of WEAL’s Federal Action Contract Compliance Committee, and in that 
capacity, she filed administrative charges of sex discrimination against over 250 
universities and colleges with the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare.217 
Representative Edith Green (D., Ohio) served on WEAL’s Advisory Board 
and, thus, she was aware of the complaints filed by WEAL.218  She also knew 
very little action had been taken by the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare to investigate those complaints,219 and she believed that more 
permanent protection against sex discrimination in education was needed given 
how easily executive orders may be revoked by subsequent presidents.220  
 
211. Max Frankel, Johnson Signs Order to Protect Women in U.S. Jobs from Bias, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 14, 1967, at 11.  
212. See Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (Oct. 17, 1967). 
213. Bernice R. Sandler, Title IX: How We Got it and What a Difference it Made, 55 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 473, 474 (2007). 
214. Id. at 474. 
215. See Bernice R. Sandler, “Too Strong for a Woman”—the Five Words That Created Title 
IX, BERNICE SANDLER (1997), http://www.bernicesandler.com/id44.htm [https://perma.cc/5S53-
MSTA]. 
216. See Sandler, supra note 213, at 475. 
217. See id. at 475–76.  
218. See id. at 476–77. 
219. See id. at 476. 
220. See Sandler, “Too Strong for a Woman,” supra note 215. 
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Therefore, she proposed H.R. 16098 on February 19, 1970.221  Section 805 of 
H.R. 16098 is largely considered the precursor to Title IX, and it ambitiously 
aimed to eradicate all sex discrimination in educational institutions.222  The 
original version of Section 805 proposed to attack sex discrimination in the 
following three ways.  First, Section 805(a) would amend Title VI by adding 
the word “sex” to Section 601.223  Second, Section 805(b) would amend Title 
VII by removing the exemption for educational institutions found in Section 
702.224  Third, Section 805(d) would remove the exemption found in the Equal 
Pay Act for executive, administrative, and professional employees.225  The goal 
of these statutory amendments was to eliminate widespread sex discrimination 
in three interrelated areas of higher education: admissions, employment, and 
salary.   
After its initial proposal, H.R. 16098 was referred to the House Committee 
on Education and Labor.226  Representative Green chaired the Subcommittee 
on Education, and in this capacity, she organized seven days of congressional 
hearings throughout June and July of 1970.227  These historical hearings are 
largely considered the first congressional hearings on education and 
employment of women.228 
Much of the testimony documented widespread sex discrimination in the 
employment of women in educational institutions.  In her initial remarks at the 
hearings, Representative Green provided statistical evidence documenting a 
disparity among women in professional occupations, as well as a disparity in 
salary and rank among faculty at universities.229  These disparities in 
educational employment were confirmed by numerous witnesses throughout 
the hearings.230  For instance, Jean Ross, Chair of the Legislative Committee of 
the American Association of University Women, stated that her organization 
 
221. H.R. 16098, 91st Cong. § 805 (1970). 
222. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523 n.13 (1982); id. at 544 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
223. H.R. 16098 § 805(a). 
224. Id. § 805(b). 
225. Id. § 805(d). 
226. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the 
Spec. Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong. 1 (1970) [hereinafter 
Hearings].  
227. See id. at I (documenting that the hearings were held on June 17, 19, 26, 29, and 30, and 
July 1 and 31, 1970).   
228. See Sandler, supra note 213, at 477. 
229. See Hearings, supra note 226, at 2–3 (statement of Rep. Edith Green); accord Sandler, 
supra note 213, at 477. 
230. See Hearings, supra note 226, at 19, 131–32, 153, 614, 646. 
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was “particularly aware of a situation in which proportionately few [women] 
occupy top positions in either administration or teaching” and she further 
complained that “the percentage of women on faculties has dropped seriously 
in recent years from 30 percent in 1940 to 19 percent in 1969.”231  Similarly, 
Wilma Scott Heide, Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Committee, shared statistics showing a disparity in rank among the few women 
hired in educational institutions, namely that women faculty were employed in 
mostly lower paying, non-tenured positions such as instructors and “only 4.7% 
of the Full Professors” were women.232  Commissioner Heide also shared her 
societal concerns that these figures suggest “to children that the teaching of 
younger children is for women[,] but that leadership in education and training 
of older youth and adults is for men.”233  Likewise, Dr. Ann Scott testified on 
behalf of the National Organization of Women and shared the results of a recent 
employment survey conducted specifically regarding the distribution of women 
in faculty at the University of Buffalo.234  She testified the survey revealed that 
“women comprise [only] 14 percent of the faculty, [and] . . . only 5 percent of 
the full professors.” 235 
Additionally, there was considerable testimony about the EEOC’s lack of 
enforcement power236 and how modifications to all portions of the bill were 
“urgently” needed “to broaden the present scope of guarantees of 
nondiscrimination in programs and activities assisted by Federal moneys.”237  
For instance, Myra Ruth Harmon, President of the National Federation of 
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, Inc., explained that her 
organization supported HR 16098 in large part due to proposed changes to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.  She explained her organization’s view that the 
Department of Labor, which enforced the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, had more enforcement power and authority to achieve change 
than the EEOC.  In other words, her testimony supported the view that Title VII 
was merely one potential option for combatting sex discrimination in 
 
231. Id. at 21 (statement of Jean Ross, Chairman, Legislative Committee, American Association 
of University Women). 
232. Id. at 131 (statement of Wilma Scott Heide, Comm’r, Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Committee). 
233. Id. at 132 (statement of Comm’r Heide). 
234. See id. at 148–153 (statement of Dr. Ann Scott, Chairman, Campus Coordinating 
Committee, National Organization for Women). 
235. Id. at 153. 
236. See id. at 621, 629 (statement of Rep. Shirley Chisholm) (confirming the ineffectiveness of 
the EEOC and stating that “unless [federal agencies] have enforcement powers, they are ignored and 
impotent”). 
237. See id. at 8 (statement of Ms. Myra Ruth Harmon, President, National Federation of 
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, Inc.). 
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employment and was not as effective as other statutory remedies, including the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.  In pertinent part, she testified: 
At present, Title VII, section 703(a)(1), of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination in hiring, 
discharging, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
including that of compensation.  
 
However, the EEOC, which is burdened with administering 
Title VII has an overload of casework.  Moreover, the EEOC 
has very little power . . . . 
 
The EEOC’s authority is limited to conciliation efforts. 
 
On the other hand, the Equal Pay Act is administered by the 
Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor.  
This agency is generally able to obtain compliance.  
 
If there is a refusal to comply or deliberate violation of the law, 
the Secretary of Labor may obtain a court injunction to restrain 
[a] continued violation or withholding of back wages legally 
due.  
 
The Secretary of Labor may also bring suit for the back wages 
upon written request of an aggrieved employee. . . .  
 
Indeed, the strength and effectiveness of enforcement 
proceedings under the Fair Labor Standards Act was one of the 
compelling reasons for BPW’s support for attaching the equal 
pay bill to the Fair Labor Standards Act.238 
The EEOC Chairman, William H. Brown, III, testified that Title VII’s 
current statutory scheme was “seriously deficient” in a number of ways.239  
First, he confirmed the ineffectiveness of the EEOC and attributed this 
ineffectiveness to heavy caseloads and lack of enforcement power.240  For 
instance, he documented that “[i]n its four years of existence, the Commission 
has received over 44 thousand charges.”241  He further explained that “25 
 
238. Id. at 10. 
239. Id. at 623 (statement of William H. Brown, III, Chairman, EEOC). 
240. See id. at 629. 
241. Id. (explaining that “27 thousand charges . . . were recommended for investigation, 
reasonable cause was found in 63% of the cases that completed the decision process, but in less than 
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percent, approximately, of complaints coming into the Commission are 
complaints based on sex.”242  Mr. Brown also testified that the numbers of 
charges alleging sex discrimination were increasing, stating that “[o]ver 12,000 
charges received by the commission since its inception have alleged disparate 
treatment based on sex, and lately that percentage has risen.  During the first 10 
months of fiscal year 1970, 2,887 charges received were based on sex with no 
letup in sight.”243  Mr. Brown noted that these numbers would have been even 
higher without the exemption in Title VII for educational institutions because 
“it seems clear that little progress has been made in the [last] 12 years” and it 
was likely “that the situation has gotten worse.”244  
Second, Mr. Brown testified Title VII had also proven ineffective in 
combatting sex discrimination through enforcement litigation brought by the 
Justice Department.  Specifically, Mr. Brown confirmed that the EEOC had 
referred numerous claims of egregious sex discrimination to the Justice 
Department “with a recommendation from our Commission that suits be 
instituted.”245  Mr. Brown testified, however, that “[i]t was never done.”246  He 
explained that these “cases would languish over at Justice, and many times we 
would get them back 2 or 3 years later with nothing being done.”247  He 
attempted to defend the Justice Department’s actions, stating their office was 
“very limited in the number” of personnel.248  When asked, however, by 
Representative Green if the Department of Justice had instituted actions based 
on other classifications such as race discrimination, Mr. Brown confirmed that 
they had, estimating that number to be approximately 50 during the previous 
few years.249  Chairman Green expressed outrage at the Justice Department’s 
 
half of these cases were we able to achieve either a partially or totally successful conciliation.  [Thus, 
i]t can readily be seen that the existing law is seriously deficient.”). 
242. Id. at 638. 
243. Id. at 624, 638. 
244. Id. at 625. 
245. Id. at 634. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 635. 
248. Id. at 636. 
249. See id. (statement of Chairman Brown in response to questions by Rep. Green).  The 
following exchange occurred about the number of actions instituted involving classifications other than 
sex:  
Mrs. Green: How many cases are there on the basis of race discrimination? 
Mr. Brown: I don’t have the exact figures, over the years, I imagine more than 50 cases 
have been instituted. 
Mrs. Green: Based on race discrimination? 
Mr. Brown: That would be race and everything else.  There may be national origin in there. 
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refusal to institute lawsuits to enforce Title VII’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination stating “that history is going to record this as the biggest cop-
out of the century.  They assert themselves in other cases of discrimination but 
not in sex discrimination cases.  It seems to me since they are required by the 
law to enforce equally, when they choose to ignore the enforcement of the law 
based on sex discrimination, they themselves can be accurately accused of 
discrimination.”250  
This ineffectiveness in litigating sex discrimination cases is particularly 
meaningful when considered along with the Department of Justice’s position 
on H.R. 16098.251  Mr. Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General with the 
Department of Justice, testified before the subcommittee and confirmed the 
nonexistence of enforcement lawsuits to combat sex discrimination.252  Mr. 
Leonard also explained that the Department of Justice did not support H.R. 
16098, and he proposed an alternative solution.253  That proposal rejected 
Subsection 805(a) of H.R. 16098, which would amend Title VI by adding the 
word “sex” to the text of the statute, instead preferring to enact separate 
legislation that prohibited only sex discrimination in educational programs.254  
He explained that the new legislation would be “patterned after . . . Title VI” 
and he discussed that this proposed design included similar enforcement 
provisions: 
The means of enforcement would be identical to those 
provided in section 602 of title VI—(1) administrative 
proceedings leading to possible termination of Federal 
assistance, or (2) other means authorized by law, including 
court suits.  All of the procedural and other safeguards 
contained in section 602 would be incorporated into the new 
statute.255 
 
Mrs. Green: But not a single one on sex discrimination? 
Mr. Brown: Not to my knowledge. 
Mrs. Green: It seems to me that their preference for pursuing cases involving race or 
national origin can’t be interpreted as anything except discrimination on the part of the 
Justice Department. Id.  
250. Id. at 621, 636 (statement of Chairman Brown); accord id. at 64 (Report of the President’s 
Task Force on Women’s Rights & Responsibilities). 
251. See id. at 677–92 (statement of Jerris Leonard, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division, 
Department of Justice). 
252. See id. at 682. 
253. See id. at 677. 
254. Id. at 678. 
255. Id. 
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Moreover, Mr. Leonard declared that the proposal also had other 
similarities to Title VI as it would “cover virtually all colleges, universities, and 
public school systems” and that the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare would have primary enforcement authority.256  
Mr. Leonard also disclosed, however, that there was a key distinction 
between Title VI and this proposal, namely, that the new proposal would not 
contain Title VI’s exemption, found in Section 604, for employment practices. 
Mr. Leonard explained: 
Unlike Title VI, the measure we propose would not contain an 
exemption for employment practices.  Considering the record 
established before this subcommittee, such coverage of 
employment practices by our proposal seems appropriate.  
Again, it should be noted that this legislation would apply to 
almost all of the institutions of higher education, both public 
and private, and to almost all public elementary and secondary 
school systems.257 
Further, Mr. Leonard explained that the proposal would prohibit a wide 
variety of sex discrimination, including employment discrimination.  He 
testified:  
Among the areas in which sex discrimination would be 
forbidden are the following: availability of scholarship and 
fellowships; admission to graduate programs; and hiring, 
compensation, and promotion of faculty and staff members.258 
Moreover, Mr. Leonard agreed, during questioning by Representative 
Brademas (D., Indiana), that one of the benefits of enacting a separate bill to 
prohibit sex discrimination was that such a bill “would more clearly cover” 
employment practices of educational institutions.  
Mr. Brademas:  Now, you also said that unlike title VI, your 
proposal of a separate bill would not exempt employment 
practices.  Do I assume that one of the justifications of your 
wanting a separate bill rather than an amending of title VI is 
you are contending that your proposal is thereby stronger in 
that it would cover employment practices?  I do not want to put 
words in your mouth; I am just trying to understand why you 
prefer one rather than the other. 
Mr. Leonard: I think that what we are really trying to say is that 
our suggestion is more directly responsive to the record that 
this subcommittee has made. . . .  I think that what we are 
 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. (emphasis added). 
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really saying is that a separate bill which would include not 
only the prohibitions as to the programs themselves, but also 
as to the employment activities that are associated with those 
programs, would more clearly cover the kind of problems 
brought out in testimony and evidence which you have 
developed.259 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Mr. Leonard’s testimony offered 
conclusive evidence of how the Department of Justice viewed the relationship 
between Title VII and the EEOC’s role in combatting sex discrimination in 
educational employment.  Specifically, the Department of Justice strongly 
opposed Subsection 805(b) of H.R. 16098, the provision that would amend 
Title VII to remove the exemption for educational institutions.260  Mr. Leonard 
explained that this statutory revision to Title VII was now unnecessary: 
[O]ur proposal to prohibit sex discrimination in all federally 
assisted education programs would apply to sex discrimination 
in employment.  Accordingly, at this time, I see no need for 
amending title VII.261 
In other words, the Department of Justice’s proposal did not grant exclusive 
power to the EEOC over claims of sex discrimination in educational 
employment.  Rather, the objective of this proposal was just the opposite: it was 
to place exclusive authority in the hands of the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, who would solely enforce the prohibition of sex 
discrimination in educational institutions.  Therefore, the sole remedy for 
claims of employment discrimination based on sex against educational 
institutions would come from the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare under the Department of Justice’s proposal, and not the EEOC. 
The Department of Justice was not the only organization that objected to 
the amendment of Title VII as a way to solve the problem of sex discrimination 
by educational institutions.  Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, also “question[ed] whether 
these provisions [the proposed amendments to Title VI and Title VII] are the 
very best vehicle for expanding existing law in this area.”262  Dr. Muirhead felt 
that neither amendment was necessary, because authority to enforce Executive 
Order 11,246, as amended by Executive Order 11,375, had been delegated to 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and this included the 
 
259. Id. at 686 (statement of Mr. Leonard in response to questions from Rep. Brademas). 
260. See id. at 677. 
261. Id. at 679. 
262. Id. at 648 (statement of Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant Secretary, HEW). 
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responsibility to investigate and remedy allegations of sex discrimination in 
educational institutions.263  He explained: 
Mr. Muirhead: By way of explanation on the matter of 
amending Title VII, we might again call to the attention of the 
chairman that Executive Order 11,246 does cover almost the 
whole universe of higher education since the order covers those 
institutions that are under Federal contracts.  So that in dealing 
with the employment practices of colleges and universities, the 
Executive Order 11,246, as amended, would reach almost all 
of the colleges and universities. 
 
Mrs. Green: Do you feel that that Executive order gives you 
authority to go in when an institution blatantly practices 
discrimination in terms of hiring faculty members, and 
awarding promotions? 
 
Mr. Muirhead: We now have that authority, because it applies 
to any college or university having a contract with the Federal 
Government.  If they are discriminating against women in any 
part of their employment practices they would then be liable to 
the provisions of this Executive Order.264 
Here again, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare officially 
opposed giving the EEOC exclusive authority over claims of sex discrimination 
in educational institutions, and specifically wanted to retain the power to 
resolve those claims, including employment discrimination claims.  
Yet, Representative Green and other witnesses testifying before the 
Subcommittee expressed concern about granting the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare exclusive authority over these claims.265  
Representative Green questioned Dr. Muirhead and Mr. Kiely, one of his 
colleagues from HEW, about HEW’s tenacity in investigating colleges and 
universities suspected of violating the executive order.  Mr. Kiely conceded that 
since the amendment of the executive order in 1967, HEW had only opened 
four investigations.266  
HEW’s lack of tenacity in investigating complaints was confirmed by Dr. 
Sandler, in her testimony as Chair of the Action Committee for WEAL, when 
discussing the extensive complaints filed by WEAL against approximately 250 
 
263. Id. at 646–47. 
264. Id. at 648 (statement of Dr. Muirhead in response to questioning from Rep. Green). 
265. Id.  
266. See id. at 649. 
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colleges and universities.267  Dr. Sandler explained that WEAL had requested a 
class action because the sex discrimination was so widespread within 
educational institutions, and she submitted a copy detailing all of the individual 
educational institutions that were specifically charged in WEAL’s 
complaints.268  In Dr. Sandler’s opinion, HEW was not serious about enforcing 
the executive order given that it had largely ignored all of these complaints.269  
Moreover, although the executive order forbade sex discrimination in most 
educational institutions, Dr. Sandler advocated against merely relying on the 
executive order, explaining that it “does not have the status of law” because 
“[i]t can be amended or suspended at the pleasure of a particular 
administration.”270  
This testimony from the 1970 hearings is crucial, contextual information 
when viewing the actual enactment of Title IX and the ultimate amendments 
Congress adopted to Title VII.  This is particularly true here given the Supreme 
Court’s designation of the “sparse” nature of the legislative history of the bill 
actually enacted as Title IX.271  Senator Birch Bayh (D., IN) also served on 
WEAL’s advisory board, and he introduced the language Congress enacted as 
Title IX as a floor amendment to the larger 1972 education bill.272  Given the 
language’s origins as a floor amendment, there were no formal committee 
hearings or committee reports in the Senate related to this amendment.273  Under 
these unique circumstances, the Supreme Court instructed in North Haven that 
statements made by Senator Bayh, as “the sponsor of the language ultimately 
enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.”274 
Despite the sparse nature of the legislative history, Senator Bayh makes 
numerous, supportive references to the 1970 hearings held in the House 
Subcommittee on Education by Representative Green.275  During Senator 
Bayh’s remarks on the Senate floor, he specifically relied on testimony given 
 
267. See id. at 308–10, 321 (statement of Dr. Bernice R. Sandler, Chairman, Action Committee 
for Federal Contract Compliance in Education, WEAL). 
268. See id. at 299, 308–10. 
269. See id. at 303.  WEAL subsequently filed an action in federal court against HEW seeking 
enforcement of Title IX and Executive Order 11,375. See Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 
879 F.2d 880, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
270. Hearings, supra note 226, at 303. 
271. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527 (1982). 
272. Id. at 524; see 118 CONG. REC. S5,804 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
273. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893–94 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting the relative lack 
of legislative history). 
274. N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 526–27. 
275. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. S5,804–05, S5,809–12 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972). 
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at the 1970 hearings by Dr. Muirhead as well as Dr. Ann Scott.276  Further, in 
support of his floor amendment, he submitted a paper written by Dr. Bernice 
Sandler, entitled The Status of Women: Employment and Admissions, detailing 
the number of charges of sex discrimination filed by the Women’s Equity 
League with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare against colleges 
and universities.277  Dr. Sandler had given similar testimony during the 1970 
hearings and referenced those hearings throughout her paper.278  Therefore, the 
1970 hearings clearly influenced not only Senator Bayh’s remarks made in 
support of his proposed amendment, but also the language proposed in the 
amendment itself.    
Specifically, two aspects of Title IX’s statutory language were influenced 
directly by the 1970 hearings.  First, as the Supreme Court explained in North 
Haven, the final bill adopted by the Conference Committee did not contain an 
exemption for educational institutions.279  The Court found the removal of this 
exemption from Title IX to be significant, declaring that this action was 
“[e]xpressly a conscious choice [and] . . . suggests that Congress intended that 
§ 901 prohibit gender discrimination in employment.”280  The testimony of Mr. 
Leonard from the 1970 hearings confirms this conclusion from the Court.  
Second, it is not just the removal of the exemption from Title IX that is 
indicative of Congress’ intent to prohibit employment discrimination, but also 
the codification of sex prohibitions into a statute separate from Title VI.  The 
language included in Senator Bayh’s floor amendment, which is the language 
enacted by Congress, did not amend Title VI to add the word “sex” to the 
statutory provisions, but instead enacted Title IX as an independent statute 
prohibiting sex discrimination.281  Given that the Department of Justice 
submitted the first proposal to codify the sex discrimination provisions into a 
separate statute, its interpretation of the implications of such separate 
codification should be considered persuasive.  Mr. Leonard’s testimony 
demonstrates that he believed that the proposal submitted by the Department of 
Justice would cover employment claims.  Mr. Leonard provided examples of 
sex discrimination that would violate its provisions and these included “hiring, 
compensation, and promotion of faculty and staff members.”282  When Mr. 
 
276. Id. at S5,805. 
277. Id. at S5,809–10. 
278. Id. at S5,810. 
279. N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 528. 
280. Id. 
281. 118 CONG. REC. S5,803, S5,808 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972); accord N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 
524. 
282. Hearings, supra note 226, at 678 (statement of Mr. Leonard).  
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Leonard advocated for his proposal over the amendment of Title VI, he 
explained that the proposal of a separate statute was “more directly responsive” 
to the testimony given at the hearings and addressed “the[se] kind[s] of 
problems.”283  The subcommittee had listened to days of testimony primarily 
about widespread employment discrimination in educational institutions and a 
proposal that failed to cover employment claims would not have been 
responsive to the testimony at all.  
Moreover, the testimony from the 1970 hearings also demonstrates that the 
statutory scheme Congress ultimately enacted was intended to offer parallel 
remedies for combatting sex discrimination.  First, testimony at the hearings 
from Dr. Muirhead indicated that the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare already was investigating charges of sex discrimination within 
educational institutions pursuant to Executive Order 11,375, with the authority 
to provide remedies to victims, including back pay.284  There is no indication 
anywhere during the 1970 hearings that Congress intended to remove this 
authority from HEW.   
To the contrary, the testimony from Mr. Leonard, of the Department of 
Justice, establishes just the opposite, and he proposed that additional authority 
be granted to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare through the 
enactment of a statute separate from Title VI forbidding sex discrimination.285  
This statute would provide the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
with the additional authority to terminate federal funding and, thus, 
strengthened this department’s ability to increase compliance.  Therefore, it was 
not necessary, according to Mr. Leonard, to amend Title VII to remove the 
educational exemption if the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was 
investigating such claims.286  
There simply are no statements or testimony throughout the hearings from 
the Department of Justice, the EEOC, or any witness or committee member 
suggesting that the EEOC be given exclusive authority over the investigation 
of claims against educational institutions.287  Moreover, the Justice 
 
283. Id. at 686. 
284. Id. 
285. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.  
286. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
287. Indeed, Senator Bayh attempted in 1971 to address the problem of sex discrimination in 
educational institutions by proposing an earlier amendment, Amendment 398 to S. 659, the Education 
Amendments of 1971.  Senator Bayh’s 1971 Amendment also did not include a proposal to amend 
Title VII. 117 CONG. REC. 30155, 30399, 30404 (1971).  Instead, Amendment 398 proposed amending 
Title VI to add several separate sections, prohibiting sex discrimination by recipients of federal 
funding, and Senator Bayh explained that enforcement, implementation, and judicial review of these 
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Department’s proposal to shift responsibility to the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare sounds reasonable given the concerns expressed 
throughout the 1970 hearings about the EEOC.  Witnesses, including Mr. 
Brown as Chairman of the EEOC, expressed frustration about the EEOC’s 
inefficiency with processing and achieving conciliation with the volume of 
charges that had been filed in its first four years.288  If the EEOC was 
overwhelmed with the number of charges being filed at that time, and those 
numbers would only increase if the educational exemption was removed, it 
seems unlikely that Congress intended to place exclusive responsibility with 
the EEOC for investigating these additional charges against educational 
institutions.   
Congress ultimately chose global and consistent reform in the area of sex 
discrimination when it amended Title VII in 1972 to remove the exemption for 
educational institutions, and three months later, enacted as Title IX as a statute 
modeled after, but separate from, Title VI.  These two statutes granted authority 
respectively to the EEOC and HEW to investigate sex discrimination in 
educational institutions, thereby ensuring that two agencies, rather than merely 
one, would have a greater capacity to investigate the systemic sex 
discrimination that was rampant in the 1960s and 1970s throughout educational 
institutions.  Given the testimony about pervasive employment discrimination 
against women in educational institutions offered during the 1970 hearings 
before the House Subcommittee on Education, and Senator Bayh’s frequent 
reliance on this testimony in 1972 during his remarks in the Senate, there should 
be no remaining doubt that Congress intended to extend protection for sex 
discrimination to these employees.  That Congress chose to extend parallel 
protection under both Title VII and Title IX to these employees only increased 
the probability of eradicating sex discrimination in educational institutions.   
V. CONCLUSION 
More than forty years have passed since the enactment of Title IX.  Despite 
numerous Supreme Court decisions broadly interpreting its prohibition of sex 
discrimination, federal courts remain divided over the proper application of 
Title IX in the employment context.  To resolve this conflict, this Article closely 
 
new provisions was intended to be “identical to those provided under title VI.” 117 CONG. REC. 30156, 
30404 (1971).  Although this amendment did not pass, the proposal provides additional evidence that 
Senator Bayh initially intended to give the Department of Education, Health and Welfare primary 
authority in enforcing the sex discrimination provisions, and in a similar manner to its authority to 
enforce the then existing race discrimination provisions under Title VI. See generally N. Haven Bd. of 
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523–25 n.13, n.14 (1982) (discussing Sen. Bayh’s 1971 proposal and 
declaring that it “plainly was meant to proscribe discrimination in employment”). 
288. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text. 
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examined the legislative history of Title IX, in particular the 1970 hearings held 
in the House Subcommittee on Education.  Congress could have simply 
amended Title VII to remove the exemption for educational institutions because 
this provided employees of educational institutions with protection from 
discrimination.  Instead, Congress did more.  Given the systemic employment 
discrimination exposed by the hearings, Congress subsequently enacted Title 
IX, thereby creating an independent and parallel remedy to Title VII that 
imposed greater penalties on educational institutions committing intentional 
sex discrimination.  Accordingly, federal courts should allow claimants to 
recover monetary damages against educations institutions by pursuing a Title 
IX claim for employment discrimination. 
